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cost-benefit ratio (CBR). There are indeed only two stable sets of equilibria enabling cooperation, one for low CBRs …-order discriminators which highlights the necessity for higher-order information to sustain cooperation through indirect reciprocity. In a …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012011661
cost-benefit ratio (CBR). There are indeed only two stable sets of equilibria enabling cooperation, one for low CBRs …-order discriminators which highlights the necessity for higher-order information to sustain cooperation through indirect reciprocity. In a …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012005678
cost-benefit ratio (CBR). There are indeed only two stable sets of equilibria enabling cooperation, one for low CBRs …-order discriminators which highlights the necessity for higher-order information to sustain cooperation through indirect reciprocity. In a …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012011743
about these welfare gains is not logically licensed. In short, labeling punishment “altruistic” because it has the effect of … punishment can help solve collective action problems. Copyright Springer Science+Business Media New York 2013 …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010989673
Most current attempts to explain the evolution - through individual selection - of pro-social behavior (i.e. behavior … that favors the group) that allows for cohesive societies among non related individuals, focus on altruistic punishment as … altruistic punishment the benefits of punishment are enjoyed collectively while its costs are borne individually. We propose that …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008520797
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010231181
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011754281
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012603825
An evolutionary tool kit is applied in this paper to explain how innate social behavior traits evolved in early human groups. These traits were adapted to the particular production requirements of the group in human phylogeny. They shaped the group members’ attitudes towards contributing to...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011048193
We demonstrate that in simple 2 X 2 games (cumulative) prospect theorypreferences can be evolutionarily stable, i.e. a population of players withprospect theory preferences can not be invaded by more rational players. Thisholds also if probability weighting is applied to the probabilities of...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005868526