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Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10000531881
We call a correspondence, defined on the set of mixed strategy profiles, a generalized best reply correspondence if it has (1) a product structure, is (2) upper semi-continuous, (3) always includes a best reply to any mixed strategy profile, and is (4) convex- and closed-valued. For each...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010319961
We prove that any deterministic evolutionary dynamic satisfying four mild requirements fails to eliminate strictly dominated strategies in some games. We also show that existing elimination results for evolutionary dynamics are not robust to small changes in the specifications of the dynamics....
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011599449
We call a correspondence, defined on the set of mixed strategy pro les, a generalized best reply correspondence if it (1) has a product structure, (2) is upper hemi-continuous, (3) always includes a best reply to any mixed strategy pro le, and (4) is convex- and closed-valued. For each...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011599479
We call a correspondence, defined on the set of mixed strategy proles, a generalized best reply correspondence if it (1) has a product structure, (2) is upper hemi-continuous, (3) always includes a best reply to any mixed strategy prole, and (4) is convex- and closed-valued. For each generalized...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009646030
We call a correspondence, defined on the set of mixed strategy profiles, a generalized best reply correspondence if it has (1) a product structure, is (2) upper semi-continuous, (3) always includes a best reply to any mixed strategy profile, and is (4) convex- and closed-valued. For each...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009195601
We characterize the smallest faces of the polyhedron of strategy profiles that could possibly be made asymptotically stable under some reasonable deterministic dynamics. These faces are Kalai and Samet's (1984) persistent retracts and are spanned by Basu and Weibull's (1991) CURB sets based on a...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008852497
We prove that any deterministic evolutionary dynamic satisfying four mild requirements fails to eliminate strictly dominated strategies in some games. We also show that existing elimination results for evolutionary dynamics are not robust to small changes in the specifications of the dynamics....
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008678225
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001575083
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001605387