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Coevolution of cooperation, response to adverse social ties and network structure

Segbroeck, Sven Van; Santos, Francisco C.; Pacheco, Jorge M. - In: Games 1 (2010) 3, pp. 317-337

increase of cooperation, which is here extended to all two-player social dilemmas. In addition, we discuss the role of the …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009751966

The evolution of cooperation through institutional incentives and optional participation

Sasaki, Tatsuya - In: Dynamic games and applications : DGA 4 (2014) 3, pp. 345-362

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010416787

On derivation and evolutionary classification of social dilemma games

Płatkowski, Tadeusz - In: Dynamic games and applications : DGA 7 (2017) 1, pp. 67-75

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011804920

Does social learning promote cooperation in social dilemmas?

Aydogmus, Ozgur; Cagatay, Hasan; Gürpınar, Erkan - In: Journal of economic interaction and coordination 15 (2020) 3, pp. 633-648

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012296907

Cooperative dilemmas with binary actions and multiple players

Peña, Jorge; Nöldeke, Georg - In: Dynamic games and applications : DGA 13 (2023) 4, pp. 1156-1193

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014553200

Carrot or stick? : group selection and the evolution of reciprocal preferences

Herold, Florian - 2003 - This version: July 2, 2003

This paper studies the evolution of both characteristics of reciprocity - the willingness to reward friendly behavior and the willingness to punish hostile behavior. Firstly, preferences for rewarding as well as preferences for punishing can survive evolution provided individuals interact within...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010440934

Matching, imitation, and coordination in networks

Cui, Zhiwei - In: Dynamic games and applications : DGA 9 (2019) 1, pp. 47-67

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012224029

The Evolution of Cooperation Through Institutional Incentives and Optional Participation

Sasaki, Tatsuya - In: Dynamic Games and Applications 4 (2014) 3, pp. 345-362

Rewards and penalties are common practical tools that can be used to promote cooperation in social institutions. The … evolution of cooperation under reward and punishment incentives in joint enterprises has been formalized and investigated … how the interplay between these mechanisms affects the evolution of cooperation in public good games. Here, we present a …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011001879

COOPERATION, COLLECTIVES FORMATION AND SPECIALIZATION

HAUERT, CHRISTOPH - In: Advances in Complex Systems (ACS) 09 (2006) 04, pp. 315-335

Cooperation in spatial evolutionary game theory has revealed various interesting insights into the problem of the … cooperation by limiting exploitation to the cluster boundaries but often collectives formation may also inhibit or even eliminate … cooperation by hindering the dispersal of cooperators. Another attempt at resolving the conflict of interest allows individuals to …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005080920

Evolutionary coalitional games

Płatkowski, Tadeusz - In: Dynamic games and applications : DGA 6 (2016) 3, pp. 396-408

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011717816