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We document that firms whose compensation peers experience weak say on pay votes reduce CEO compensation following those votes. Reductions reflect proxy adviser concerns about peers' compensation contracts and are stronger when CEOs receive excess compensation, when they compete more closely...
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The use of equity incentives is significantly greater in countries with stronger insider trading restrictions, and these higher incentives are associated with higher total pay. These findings are robust to alternative definitions of insider trading restrictions and enforcement, and to panel...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010681829
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The use of equity incentives is significantly greater in countries with stronger insider trading restrictions, and these higher incentives are associated with higher total pay. These findings are robust to alternative definitions of insider trading restrictions and enforcement, and to panel...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012857393
Increases in CEO compensation following acquisitions are unique to stock-financed acquisitions. These compensation increases are driven by increases in equity-based compensation, and are concentrated in riskier acquirers, riskier acquisitions, and in acquirers whose CEOs have low exposure to the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013405148