Widespread losses during the recent financial crisis have increased concerns that equity-based compensation for bank CEOs causes excessive risk-taking by banks. Debt-based compensation, so-called inside debt, aligns the interests of CEOs with those of external creditors. We examine whether...

Bank payouts divert cash to shareholders, while leaving behind riskier and less liquid assets to repay debt holders in the future. Bank payouts, therefore, constitute a type of risk-shifting that benefits equity holders at the expense of debt holders. In this paper, we provide insights on how...

We introduce the idea of Executive Compensation Faultline (ECF) strength as a means to capture the alignment of the whole top management team’s incentives across multiple compensation characteristics. We build on previous literature on demographic faultlines, which suggests that strong...

We analyze how the structure of executive compensation affects the risk choices made by bank CEOs. For a sample of acquiring US banks, we employ the Merton distance to default model to show that CEOs with higher pay-risk sensitivity engage in risk-inducing mergers. Our findings are driven by two...