We integrate an agency problem into search theory to study executive compensation in a market equilibrium. A CEO can choose to stay or quit and search after privately observing an idiosyncratic shock to the firm. The market equilibrium endogenizes CEOs' and firms' outside options and captures...

We investigate the fundamental determinants and value implications of corporate social responsibility (CSR) around the world. We contrast three broad views on CSR: (1) it is a response to government failures; (2) it reflects individual and societal preferences; (3) it is an equilibrium result of...

We take a state-stewardship view on the corporate governance model and executive compensation policies in economies with strong political involvement. In such a highly politically-oriented institutional environment, the business elites are not just professional managers but are also de facto...

Purpose We take a state-stewardship view on corporate governance and executive compensation in economies with strong political involvement, where state-appointed managers act as responsible “stewards” rather than “agents” of the state. Methodology/approach We test this view on China and...