Purpose – The purpose of this paper is to solve the optimal managerial compensation problem when shareholders are either naïvely optimistic or rational. Design/methodology/approach –The paper uses applied game theory to derive the optimal CEO compensation package with over optimistic...

Despite syndicated loan accounts for more than 40% of bank commercial loans, little is known about how bank CEO compensation impacts bank syndicated loan contracting. We find that banks with more CEO inside debt have lower non-performance loans and lend to safer borrowers. Using a two-stage...

This paper develops an agency model to analyze the optimality of executive stock option compensation in the presence of information manipulation. The analyses show that although information manipulation is positively related to the size of option compensation, the relative size of...

This paper examines the effects of executive compensation and potential for earnings management on the incidence of shareholder class action lawsuits and their outcomes. Although damage measurement factors,managerial option intensity, and earnings management all significantly affect the...