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The objective of CEO compensation is to better align CEO-shareholder interests by inducing CEOs to make more optimal (albeit risky) investment decisions. However, recent research suggests that these incentives have a significant down-side(i.e., they motivate executives to manipulate reported...
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Prior research suggests an asymmetric relation between CEO cash compensation and firm performance as measured by market-adjusted stock returns. As discussed by Leone et al. (2006), the underlying rationale for this asymmetry is the difficulty in the ex post settling- up of cash compensation. We...
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Although stock return-based performance metrics are common in CEO compensation contracts in the US, similar CEO pay arrangements may not be appropriate in India given higher stock return volatility and lower liquidity. Instead, sales growth as a performance metric could be useful in...
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Extant research argues that borrowing from financial intermediaries subjects managers to external monitoring. However, given managers' flexibility in choosing the type of debt financing, why would managers submit themselves to external monitoring? Recent theory points to the role of managerial...
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