This study focuses on the relation between current compensation and past performance measures as signals of a CEO’s ability. We develop a simple two-period principal-agent model with moral hazard and adverse selection and test theoretical predictions using CEO compensation data from 1993-2006....

Corporate acquisitions are arguably one of the most important and biggest decisions CEOs have to make; yet many acquisitions do not create value for shareholders. We examine whether CEO compensation is reduced when the fair value of the acquired business units are written down (i.e. goodwill...

In this study, focusing on the period 1996-2010, we conduct an empirical investigation of how warnings by industry peer firms about future earnings affect CEO compensation structure. These warnings contain information about the industry, signaling dim industry prospects and possibly triggering...

In this study, we examine how business strategies affect compensation contracting and performance evaluation. Using textual measures of business strategies derived from corporate 10-K filings, we find that firms adopting the operational excellence strategy place a higher compensation weight on...