I consider multi-round cheap talk communication environments in which, after a lie, the informed party has no memory of the content of the lie. I characterize the equilibria with forgetful liars in such settings assuming that a liar's expectation about his past lie coincides with the equilibrium...

This article considers an intertemporal decision problem in which the agent has limited foresight. It offers an interpretation of why people may smoke when they are young - as a result of having a short horizon of foresight - and refrain from smoking when they get older - as a result of having...

This article considers an intertemporal decision problem in which the agent has limited foresight. It offers an interpretation of why people may smoke when they are youngas a result of having a short horizon of foresightand refrain from smoking when they get olderas a result of having better...

This paper considers an intertemporal decision problem in which the agent has limited foresight. It offers an interpretation of why people may smoke when they are young - and arguably have a short horizon of foresight and refrain from smoking when they get older - and their foresight is better.