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This paper introduces signaling in a global game so as to examine the informational role of policy in coordination environments such as currency crises and bank runs. While exogenous asymmetric information has been shown to select a unique equilibrium, we show that the endogenous information...
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This paper shows how rational investors can have different degrees of optimism regarding the prospects of the economy, even if they share exactly the same information regarding all economic fundamentals. The key is that heterogeneity in expectations regarding endogenous outcomes can emerge as a...
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We study flexible public information design in global games. In addition to receiving public information from the designer, agents are endowed with exogenous private information and must decide between two actions (invest and not invest), the profitability of which depends on unknown...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10015415285
We study flexible public information design in global games. In addition to receiving public information from the designer, agents are endowed with exogenous private information and must decide whether or not to “attack” a status-quo. The designer does not trust the agents to play favourably...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014349319
How does the economy respond to news about future policies or future fundamentals? Standard practice assumes that agents have common knowledge of such news and face no uncertainty about how others will respond. Relaxing this assumption attenuates the general-equilibrium effects of news and...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012980185
We develop an equivalence between the equilibrium effects of incomplete information and those of two behavioral distortions: myopia, or extra discounting of the future; and anchoring of current behavior to past behavior, as in models with habit persistence or adjustment costs. We show how these...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012920374