Agents forming adaptive expectations generally make systematic mistakes. This characterization has fostered the rejection of adaptive expectations in macroeconomics. Experimental evidence, however, shows that in complex environments human subjects frequently rely on adaptive heuristics –...

Agents forming adaptive expectations generally make systematic mistakes. This characterization has fostered the rejection of adaptive expectations in macroeconomics. Experimental evidence, however, shows that in complex environments human subjects frequently rely on adaptive heuristics –...

We explore the intertwined dynamics of asset prices and the macroeconomy in a Behavioural model of Credit Cycles (BCC) characterized by a credit friction à la Kiyotaki and Moore and heterogeneous expectations cum heuristic switching à la Brock and Hommes. This behavioural approach allows to...

We explore the intertwined dynamics of asset prices and the macroeconomy in a Behavioural model of Credit Cycles (BCC) characterized by a credit friction à la Kiyotaki and Moore and heterogeneous expectations cum heuristic switching à la Brock and Hommes. This behavioural approach allows to...

The recent macroeconomic literature stresses the importance of managing heterogeneous expectations in the formulation of monetary policy. We use a simple frictionless DSGE model to investigate inflation dynamics under alternative interest rate rules when agents have heterogeneous expectations...

The way in which individual expectations shape aggregate macroeconomic variables is crucial for the transmission and effectiveness of monetary policy. We study the individual expectations formation process and the interaction with monetary policy, within a standard New Keynesian model, by means...

We introduce a simple equilibrium model of a market for loans, where households lend to firms based on heterogeneous expectations about their loan default probability. Agents select among heterogeneous expectation rules, based upon their relative performance. A small fraction of pessimistic...

We introduce a simple equilibrium model of a market for loans, where house- holds lend to firms based on heterogeneous expectations about their loan default probability. Agents select among heterogeneous expectation rules, based upon their relative performance. A small fraction of pessimistic...