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Bayesian persuasion and information design

Kamenica, Emir - In: Annual review of economics 11 (2019), pp. 249-272

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012623452

Dominiak, Adam; Gersbach, Hans - 2024

We study communication in ambiguous environments. Agents communicate individual decisions sequentially. Based on the …, the decisions differ no matter how long the communication lasts. Such persistent disagreements are precluded in Bayesian … frameworks endowed with a common prior. When communication is private and nobody is excluded from it, we show that ambiguity …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014484275

Setting an exam as an information design problem

Shimoji, Makoto - In: International journal of economic theory 19 (2023) 3, pp. 559-579

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014335561

Information design in games : certification approach

Smolin, Alex; Yamashita, Takuro - 2023

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014327842

Knowledge, awareness and probabilistic beliefs

Sadzik, Tomasz - In: The B.E. journal of theoretical economics 21 (2021) 2, pp. 489-524

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012593891

Mechanism design with ambiguous transfers : an analysis in finite dimensional naive type spaces

Guo, Huiyi - In: Journal of economic theory 183 (2019), pp. 76-105

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012131296

On social norms and beliefs : a model of manager environmental behavior

García, Jorge H.; Wei, Jiegen - In: Resource and energy economics 65 (2021), pp. 1-12

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013361714

Dynamic consistency, valuable information and subjective beliefs

Galanis, Spyros - In: Economic theory 71 (2021) 4, pp. 1467-1497

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012584496

On Hurwicz-Nash equilibria of non-Bayesian games under incomplete information

Beißner, Patrick; Khan, M. Ali - In: Games and economic behavior 115 (2019), pp. 470-490

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012175536

Adversarial coordination and public information design

Inostroza, Nicolás; Pavan, Alessandro - In: Theoretical economics : TE ; an open access journal in … 20 (2025) 2, pp. 763-813

We study flexible public information design in global games. In addition to receiving public information from the designer, agents are endowed with exogenous private information and must decide between two actions (invest and not invest), the profitability of which depends on unknown...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10015415285