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Experimental tests of an allocation mechanism for private, public or externality goods

Coursey, Don L. - In: Papers in experimental economics, (pp. 490-506). 1991

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001279743

Starting small toward voluntary formation of efficient large groups in public goods provision

Charness, Gary; Yang, Chun-lei - In: Journal of economic behavior & organization : JEBO 102 (2014), pp. 119-132

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010389701

Third Party Reward and Punishment : Group Size, Efficiency and Public Goods

Almenberg, Johan - 2010

Costly third party punishment has been interpreted as a tool for studying the enforcement of social norms. Experiments on this topic typically involve a third party observer who can pay to decrease the payoff of a player who has behaved selfishly (or generously) toward another. We investigate...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013135695

Using an Exogenous Mechanism to Examine Efficient Probabilistic Punishment

Qin, Xiangdong - 2019

Free riding can be made more costly by increasing either the probability of being caught or the severity of the punishment. However, neither option is without cost. What is the tradeoff between these strategies? In this study, we introduce an exogenous punishment mechanism that varies the...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012872264

Leveling Up? An Inter-Neighborhood Experiment on Parochialism and the Efficiency of Multi-Level Public Goods Provision

Gallier, Carlo - 2017

Many public goods can be provided at different spatial levels. Evidence from social identity theory and in … outcomes (parochialism) could harm efficiency. Building on the experimental paradigm of multi-level public good games and the …, parochialism does not interfere with efficiency: The average subject responds to a change in relative productivities at the local …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012961855

Contribution-based grouping under noise

Nax, Heinrich H.; Murphy, Ryan O.; Duca, Stefano; … - In: Games 8 (2017) 4, pp. 1-23

-negligible degrees of imprecision and error. This observation raises the more general question of whether mechanisms that work in theory …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011771262

Are cooperators efficiency- or fair-minded? : evidence from a public goods experiment

Levati, M. Vittoria (contributor); … - 2007

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003553908

Is regulation by milestones efficiency enhancing? : an experimental study of environmental protection

Freytag, Andreas; Güth, Werner; Koppel, Hannes; … - In: European journal of political economy 33 (2014), pp. 71-84

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010378856

Is regulation by milestones efficiency enhancing? : an experimental study of environmental protection

Freytag, Andreas; Güth, Werner; Koppel, Hannes; … - 2010

Viewing individual contributions as investments in emission reduction we rely on the familiar linear public goods-game to set global reduction targets which, if missed, imply that all payoffs are destroyed with a certain probability. Regulation by milestones does not only impose a final...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008747599

The value of punishment of free riders : a case study on the receiving fee system of the Japanese public broadcasting organization

Kakizawa, Hisanobu - 2017

Social preferences for the punishment of free riders are critical for generating cooperative behavior in human society. Focusing on the receiving fees of Japan's public broadcaster, this study analyses how punishment of free riders, that is, the strengthening of legal responses against them,...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011760399