We study how financial intermediation affects real market variables when an incumbent firm is threatened by entry to its market and must contract with a bank for outside funds. Contracts between the bank and the monopolist are short-term and redesigned after the entry decision of a second firm...

We study how the threat of entry affects financial contracting between an incumbent firm and a bank, in a stochastic and dynamic environment. Contracts are short term and public. We determine the effects of the first period financial contract on the first period outputs in face of the threat of...

In this paper the impact of noise on dynamic adverse selection in principal-agent relationships is examined. Significant deviations in terms of equilibrium actions and payments occur, when compared to deterministic environments. Information dissipates slowly, so payments to agents who stand to...

The impact of information dissemination and experimentation on dynamic adverse selection in noisy agency relationships is examined. Significant deviations in terms of equilibrium actions and payments occur, when compared to deterministic environments. Information dissipates slowly, so payments...

We propose a new methodology for structural estimation of dynamic discrete choice models. We combine the Dynamic Programming (DP) solution algorithm with the Bayesian Markov Chain Monte Carlo algorithm into a single algorithm that solves the DP problem and estimates the parameters...