We study the role of self-interest and social preferences in referenda. Our analysis is based on collective purchasing decisions of university students on deep-discount flat rate tickets for public transportation and culture. Individual usage data allows quantifying monetary benefits associated...

We develop and test a theory of voting and turnout decisions that integrates self-interest, social preferences, and expressive motives. Our model implies that if pocketbook benefits are relevant, voters either perceive their impact on the outcome to be non-negligible, or expressive motivations...

We develop and test a theory of voting and turnout decisions that integrates self-interest, social preferences, and expressive motives. Our model implies that if pocketbook benefits are relevant, voters either perceive their impact on the outcome to be non-negligible, or expressive motivations...

We study the role of self-interest and social preferences in referenda. Our analysis is based on collective purchasing decisions of university students on deep-discount flat rate tickets for public transportation and culture. Individual usage data allows quantifying monetary benefits associated...

Economic models on voting usually assume that voters maximize their own material interests. Yet there is convincing evidence that people also tend to care about fairness and the common good. Furthermore, some voters may derive utility from the act of voting in a certain way, independent of...

Women are severely underrepresented in American politics, especially among Republicans. This underrepresentation may result from women being less willing to run for office, from voter bias against women, or from political structures that make it more difficult for women to compete. Here we show...

Women are severely underrepresented in American politics, especially among Republicans. This underrepresentation may result from women being less willing to run for office, from voter bias against women, or from political structures that make it more difficult for women to compete. Here we show...

Most research in economics models agents somehow motivated by out-comes. Here, we model agents motivated by procedures instead, whereprocedures are dened independently of an outcome. To that end, wedesign procedures which yield the same expected outcomes or carry thesame information on other's...

We study the effects of different tax reporting mechanisms in experi-mental double auction markets in the laboratory. The sales tax is paidby the seller, and we compare market outcomes in a no-tax conditionto cases where (i) tax evasion is impossible, (ii) taxes can be evaded butthere is an...