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At the initial stage of this project, the project group consisted of Asbjørn Aaheim, Magnus Hatlebakk and the authors. The authors are grateful for the discussion with the other project participants at this stage. We also had very useful discussion with the marine researcher Sigurd Tjelmeland...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011967999
At the initial stage of this project, the project group consisted of Asbjørn Aaheim, Magnus Hatlebakk and the authors. The authors are grateful for the discussion with the other project participants at this stage. We also had very useful discussion with the marine researcher Sigurd Tjelmeland...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10004980786
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001711911
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009300507
In public good games, voluntary contributions tend to start of high and decline as the game is repeated. If high contributors are matched, however, contributions tend to stay high. We propose a formalization predicting that high contributors will selfselect into groups committed to charitable...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003826571
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011526368
If individual abilities are imperfectly observable, statistical discrimination may affect hiring decisions. In our lab experiment, pairs of subjects solve simple mathematical problems. Subjects then hire others to perform similar tasks. Before choosing whom to hire, they receive information...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012001812
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If individual abilities are imperfectly observable, statistical discrimination may affect hiring decisions. In our lab experiment, pairs of subjects solve simple mathematical problems. Subjects then hire others to perform similar tasks. Before choosing whom to hire, they receive information...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012834571