We comprehensively investigate misperceptions about pro-social behavior and the extent to which punishment and rewarding is under- or overestimated in laboratory experiments. Our games and treatments cover a large range of decision environments, in which there are different (i) trade-offs (e.g.,...

In this paper we study taxpayers’ behavior when confronted to different levels of tax rates in the lab. Using the decisions on the exerted effort and/or the declared tasks we also test the existence of a Laffer curve. We implemented a 2x2 design, combining the im/possibility of evading taxes...

This paper analyzes an auction mechanism that excludes overoptimistic bidders inspired by the rules of the procurement auctions adopted by several Japanese local governments. Our theoretical and experimental results suggest that the endogenous exclusion rule reduces the probability of suffering...

Due to its simplicity the plurality voting system is frequently used to choose a common representative or project. Nevertheless it may fail to provide a socially efficient decision as a majority can outvote any minority even if the majority’s gain does not compensate the loss suffered by the...

Three well‐known matching mechanisms designed to solve the college admissions problems are analyzed in the experimental laboratory in different informational settings. We observe that when the level of information is significantly increased, the proportion of schools and teachers that submit...

We analyze two well-known matching mechanisms - the Gale-Shapley, and the Top Trading Cycles (TTC) mechanisms - in the experimental lab in three different informational settings, and study the role of information in individual decision making. Our results suggest that - in line with the theory -...