A two-persons bargaining problem often consists of initially incompatible demands that can be unilaterally reduced by sequential concessions. In a 2 x 2 x 2-factorial design we distinguish between reliable and unreliable concessions, between a static and dynamic settings and between symmetric...

Conventions can be narrowly interpreted as coordinated ways of equilibriumplay, i.e., a specific convention tells all players in a game withmultiple strict equilibria which equilibrium to play. In our view, coordinationoften takes place before learning about the games. Thus, one hasto coordinate...

A conditional cooperator in a public goods game wants to match hispartners' expected contribution. We investigate theoretically and empiricallywhether (and to what extent) conditional cooperation can explainhow individual contributions evolve in a repeated two-person public goodsexperiment using...

The Nash Bargaining problem in the context of a random utility modelyields a stochastic demand for each player, conditional on his or her beliefs re-garding the other player's behavior. We derive a symmetric logit equilibriumunder naive expectations that converges to the Nash axiomatic solution...

Hegemony is a central feature of contemporary international politicsbut it remains seriously under-theorized. We draw on cooperative game theoryto represent and analyze different aspects of hegemony. After developing ageneral conception of hegemony, we analyze the circumstances under which...

We report on an experiment designed to explore the interrelation of otherregardingconcerns with attitudes towards risk and delay when the latterhave a social dimension, i.e., pertain to one's own and another person'spayos. For this sake, we compare evaluations of several prospects, eachof which...

We study a market in which both buyers and sellers can decide to preempt and set theirquantities before market clearing. Will this lead to preemption on both sides of the market,only one side of the market, or to no preemption at all? We …nd that preemption tends to beasymmetric in the sense...

In close interaction, group allocations are often fair due to our desire to betreated fairly and to act fairly. When this desire conflicts with other strong motivationsa typical reaction is to trade off fairness against these other concerns. Inequ(al)ity aversion allows capturing such trade off...