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We study experimentally behavior in a repeated partnership game with public imperfect monitoring, and focus on whether subjects are affected by renegotiation concerns. The signal in our design is rather simple: it indicates only a success or a failure in each period. In some treatments, the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013007053
In our laboratory experiment, subjects, in sequence, have to predict the value of a good. The second subject in the sequence makes his prediction twice: first ("first belief"), after he observes his predecessor's prediction; second ("posterior belief"), after he observes his private signal. We...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012621137
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We study how subjects in an experiment use different forms of public information about their opponents' past behavior. In the absence of public information, subjects appear to use rather detailed statistics summarizing their private experiences. If they have additional public information, they...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011437784
We study social learning in a continuous action space experiment. Subjects, acting in sequence, state their belief about the value of a good, after observing their predecessors' statements and a private signal. We compare the behavior in the laboratory with the Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011924642
In our laboratory experiment, subjects, in sequence, have to predict the value of a good. We elicit the second subject's belief twice: first ("first belief"), after he observes his predecessor's action; second ("posterior" belief.), after he observes his private signal. Our main result is that...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011871330
We study social learning in a continuous action space experiment. Subjects, acting in sequence, state their belief about the value of a good, after observing their predecessors' statements and a private signal. We compare the behavior in the laboratory with the Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011663632
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011665751
We present a social learning experiment in which subjects predict the value of a good in sequence. We elicit each subject's belief twice: first ("first belief"), after he observes his predecessors' prediction; second, after he also observes a private signal. Our main result is that subjects...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011625815