In this paper we show that if a very small, exogenously given probability of terminating the exchange is introduced in an elementary investment game, reciprocators play more often the defection strategy. Everything happens as if they hide behind probabilities in order to break the trust...

This paper reports the results from a real-effort team production experiment, where best performers can impose either tacit or explicit sanctions on their less-performing partners. The behavior of the best performer in the team differs from one condition to another. When explicit sanctions are...

This paper reports the results from a lab experiment in which subjects playing the manager role can implement either an efficient/inegalitarian allocation or an inefficient/egalitarian allocation of payoffs. The experiment simulates a stylized managerial context by allowing the manager to...

Humans often lie strategically. We study this problem in an ultimatum game involving informed proposers and uninformed responders, where the former can send an unverifiable statement about their endowment. If there are some intrinsically honest proposers, a simple message game shows that the...