Many public goods may be characterized as having multiple provision points. These goods are provided in discrete rather than continuous quantities and only if specified minimal levels of funding are attained. This chapter describes an experiment that examines allocations to a multiple provision...

The use of monetary incentives may not affect behavior much in some contexts, or it may simply reduce the dispersion of data around some theoretical prediction. But the experiments indicate that incentive effects may be large and systematic in other contexts. In the absence of a widely accepted...

Public goods experiments are notable in that they produce an array of systematic treatment effects that are inconsistent with the predictions of standard game theory. In response, theorists have proposed alternative models designed to explain these interesting (and often intuitive) patterns in...

The standard public goods experiment involves linear payoffs in which the unique Nash equilibrium is at the lower boundary, i.e., full free riding. Contributions in these experiments tend to decline toward the Nash equilibrium in most treatments, but contributions persist even after as many as...