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We study both theoretically and experimentally the set of Nash equilibria of a classical one-dimensional election game with two candidates. These candidates are interested in power and ideology, but their weights on these two motives are not necessarily identical. Apart from obtaining the well...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010198494
We test the Average Credible Deviation Criterion (ACDC), a stability measure and refinement for cheap talk equilibria introduced in De Groot Ruiz, Offerman & Onderstal (2012a). ACDC has been shown to be predictive under general conditions and to organize data well in previous experiments meant...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013113620
way that can be predicted by the credibility of the neologism; and receivers' behavior indicates that they understand …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011994751
We conduct a laboratory experiment to test whether subjects tend to meet the expectations of others (the guilt aversion hypothesis). The specificity of our approach is that second-order beliefs are manipulated exogenously just by changing the parameters of the experimental game. In particular,...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013034626
-talk recommendation. We study the extent to which leaders in such situations possess “social credibility” defined as the ability to … coordinate followers' behaviors with their statements. In an experiment, we find that leaders manage social credibility by … invest are followed. We identify factors that affect the persistence of social credibility …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012984150
efficiency, we find that liability has a crucial, but verifiability only a minor effect. Allowing sellers to build up reputation …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010294835
efficiency, we find that liability has a crucial, but verifiability only a minor effect. Allowing sellers to build up reputation …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005423961
efficiency, we find that liability has a crucial, but verifiability only a minor effect. Allowing sellers to build up reputation …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005427646
By providing incentives for sellers to act in a trustworthy manner, reputation mechanisms in many online environments …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014212262
We study equilibrium reporting behavior in Fischbacher and Föllmi-Heusi (2013)-type cheating games when agents have a fixed cost of lying and image concerns not to be perceived as a liar. We show that equilibria naturally arise in which agents with low costs of lying randomize among a set of...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012902152