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The Core and the Equal Division Core in a Three-Person Unstructured Bargaining Experiment : The Weakest Coalition is Ignored

Shinoda, Taro; Funaki, Yukihiko - 2022

Cooperative game theory addresses two problems: coalition formation and payoff distribution. We hypothesize that the existence of the core, which is a fundamental concept in cooperative game theory, affects coalition formation, and we examine this hypothesis through a laboratory experiment. In...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014241367

The Core and the Equal Division Core in a Three-Person Unstructured Bargaining Experiment : The Weakest Coalition is Ignored

Shinoda, Taro; Funaki, Yukihiko - 2022

formation of the grand coalition. Second, the availability of public communication also induces the formation of the grand …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013296582

Focused Power : Experimental Manifestation of the Shapley-Shubik Power Index

Geller, Chris; Mustard, Jamie - 2007

Experiments evaluate the fit of the Shapley-Shubik Power Index to a controlled human environment. Subjects with differing votes divide a fixed purse by majority rule in online chat rooms under supervision. Earnings serve as a measure of power. Chat rooms and processes for selecting subjects...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014222269

Focused power : experimental manifestation of the Shapley-Shubik Power Index

Geller, Chris (contributor); Mustard, Jamie (contributor); … - 2007

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003794319

An experiment on the Nash program : a comparison of two strategic mechanisms implementing the Shapley value

Chessa, Michela; Hanaki, Nobuyuki; Lardon, Aymeric; … - In: Games and economic behavior 141 (2023), pp. 88-104

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014454431

The effect of choosing a proposer through a bidding procedure in implementing the Shapley value

Chessa, Michela; Hanaki, Nobuyuki; Lardon, Aymeric; … - In: Journal of economic psychology : research in economic … 93 (2022), pp. 1-19

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014251196

An experiment on the Nash program : comparing two strategic mechanisms implementing the shapley value

Chessa, Michela; Hanaki, Nobuyuki; Lardon, Aymeric; … - 2022

We experimentally compare two well-known mechanisms inducing the Shapley value as an ex ante equilibrium outcome of a noncooperative bargaining procedure: the demand-basedWinter's demand commitment bargaining mechanism and the offer-based Hart and Mas-Colell procedure. Our results suggest that...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013252966

The effect of choosing a proposer through a bidding procedure in implementing the Shapley value

Chessa, Michela; Hanaki, Nobuyuki; Lardon, Aymeric; … - 2022 - Revised August 2022

bidding stage on the resulting outcomes such as the frequency of grand coalition formation, efficiency, and the distance … greater efficiency than PC-W, but also that the average allocation is closer to the Shapley value for those groups that formed …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013252972

An experimental Nash program : a comparison of non-cooperative v.s. cooperative bargaining experiments

Chessa, Michela; Hanaki, Nobuyuki; Lardon, Aymeric; … - 2023

frequency of the grand coalition formation, the higher efficiency, and the allocation belonging to the bargaining set is …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014451922

Negotiating cooperation under uncertainty : communication in noisy, indefinitely repeated interactions

Dvorak, Fabian; Fehrler, Sebastian - 2018

structures - perfect, imperfect public, and imperfect private - communication boosts efficiency. However, under imperfect … round of the game. Beyond improving coordination, communication increases efficiency by making subjects' play more lenient …Case studies of cartels and recent theory suggest that repeated communication is key for stable cooperation in …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011925584