employee's performance was poor. The justification assures the employee that the manager has not distorted the evaluation …? Suppose a manager's evaluation is private information. Justifying her evaluation is costly but limits the principal's scope … for distorting her evaluation of the employee. I show that the manager justifies her evaluation if and only if the …

employee’s performance was poor. The justification assures the employee that the manager has not distorted the evaluation …? Suppose a manager’s evaluation is private information. Justifying her evaluation is costly but limits the principal’s scope … for distorting her evaluation of the employee. I show that the manager justifies her evaluation if and only if the …

employee’s performance was poor. The justification assures the employee that the manager has not distorted the evaluation …? Suppose a manager’s evaluation is private information. Justifying her evaluation is costly but limits the principal’s scope … for distorting her evaluation of the employee. I show that the manager justifies her evaluation if and only if the …

communicated might matter. In a controlled field experiment, we study a minimally invasive change in the communication of a well …

uncertain about which contract will be implemented, can increase the payoff of the high type principal to approximate her full …

that the principal cares for them. Principals can signal their altruism by offering a generous contract, consisting of a … agents do not reciprocate the principal's altruism, the principal may find it optimal to write a contract that simultaneously … signals his altruism and screens reciprocal worker types. I show that such a contract is characterised by excessively strong …