two different remuneration functions allowing the participants to act as owners or managers of a company. …

In many organizational contexts, managers might have self-serving incentives whereby giving high evaluations to … employees comes at the expense of their own payoff. In this study, I examine the impact of managers’ self-serving incentives on … the collection and use of information for the purpose of subjective performance evaluation. I find that managers with self …

We examine how clawback provisions and board monitoring affect managers' use of discretion to achieve earnings targets … amount of earnings management activity. This null result arises because, while clawbacks do curb the extent to which managers … managers' use of discretion when making operational decisions (real earnings management). In contrast, strong board monitoring …

.98%-32.43%. Motivated by managerial risk aversion, managers are in favor of lower customer concentration, resulting in a sub-optimal level …

two different remuneration functions allowing the participants to act as owners or managers of a company. …