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Although many real bargaining situations involve more than one person on each side of the bargaining table, much of the … theoretical and experimental research concentrates on two single players. We study a simple extension: bilateral bargaining of …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011116853
Using a unique experimental data set, we investigate how asymmetric legal rights shape bargainers’ aspiration levels through moral entitlements derived from equity norms and number prominence. Aspiration formation is typically hard to observe in real life. Our study involves 15 negotiations...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011771180
This paper presents an analysis of general time preferences in the canonical Rubinstein (1982) model of bargaining …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011705183
experimental results suggest: In a simple bargaining game with an exogenous mediation proposal, the likelihood of conflict is … independent of the balance of power. If bargaining involves endogenous demand choices, however, the likelihood of conflict is … higher if power is more imbalanced. Even though endogenous bargaining outcomes reflect the players' unequal fighting …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011576771
I revisit the Rubinstein (1982) model for the classic problem of price hag- gling and show that bargaining can become a … of fixed bargaining costs). Augmenting the protocol with unilateral exit options for responding bargainers generally …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013191479
I revisit the Rubinstein (1982) model for the classic problem of price haggling and show that bargaining can become a … of fixed bargaining costs). Augmenting the protocol with unilateral exit options for responding bargainers generally …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013358929
/2; if neither offer falls into the interval, there is no settlement. Comparisons are made with other bargaining mechanisms …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014043989
Traditionally, allocations by dictators in Dictator Games (gifts) have been explained by aspects of altruism, reciprocity, and fairness. However, this assumes the gift to be desirable to the dictators and responder. Giving may also be driven by the source of the endowment. We examine this by...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010776369
Traditionally, larger than equilibrium allocations by proposers in Dictator Games (gifts) have been explained by aspects of altruism, reciprocity, and fairness. However, this assumes the gift to be mutually desirable to the proposer and responder. Giving may also be driven by a desire of the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010960259
We use a laboratory experiment to study bargaining with random implementation. We modify the standard Nash demand game …, one bargainer receives his/her demand, with the other getting the remainder. We use an asymmetric bargaining set …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010588271