We provide supporting evidence from the laboratory for the Nash predictions of the homogeneous-good Bertrand model under asymmetric constant unit costs.

In this paper I consider a complex decision problem where subjects have to cope with a time horizon of uncertain duration and must update their termination probabilities which depend on stochastic events during "life". First I describe how economic theory suggests to solve the decision problem....

We study a market in which both buyers and sellers can decide to preempt and set theirquantities before market clearing. Will this lead to preemption on both sides of the market,only one side of the market, or to no preemption at all? We …nd that preemption tends to beasymmetric in the sense...

We examine the strategic behavior of leaders and followers in sequential duopoly experiments in which followers either perfectly observe the leaders' actions or else observe nothing. (...)

We confront a representative sample of 1102 Dutch individuals with a series of incentivized investment decisions and also elicit their time preferences. There are two treatments that differ in the frequency at which individuals decide about the invested amount. The low frequency treatment...