The literature on experimentation and learning typically imposes a special dynamic structure: the only connection between periods is the updating of beliefs. Hence, both the present action and present signal realization only affect the future by changing the distribution of future beliefs. In...

Typically the literature on experimentation and learning imposes a special dynamic structure: the present signal realization only affects the future by changing the distribution of future beliefs. In many contexts however the model may have "signal dependence", that is, the current signal may...

In this paper the impact of noise on dynamic adverse selection in principal-agent relationships is examined. Significant deviations in terms of equilibrium actions and payments occur, when compared to deterministic environments. Information dissipates slowly, so payments to agents who stand to...

The impact of information dissemination and experimentation on dynamic adverse selection in noisy agency relationships is examined. Significant deviations in terms of equilibrium actions and payments occur, when compared to deterministic environments. Information dissipates slowly, so payments...

The dynamics of incentive contracts under asymmetric information have long been an important topic in economics. We address this topic in this paper by considering a stochastic, two-period principal-agent relationship, in which the true state of the world can take on two possible values and is...