We develop a theoretical model to identify and compare partial and equilibrium effects of uncertainty and the magnitude of fines on punishment and deterrence. Partial effects are effects on potential violators' and punishers' decisions when the other side's behavior is exogenously given....

We develop a theoretical model to identify and compare partial and equilibrium effects of uncertainty and the magnitude of fines on punishment and deterrence. Partial effects are effects on potential violators' and punishers' decisions when the other side's behavior is exogenously given....

We develop a theoretical model to identify and compare partial and equilibrium effects of uncertainty and the magnitude of fines on punishment and deterrence. Partial effects are effects on potential violators' and punishers' decisions when the other side's behavior is exogenously given....

Based on a simple theoretical model, we use a laboratory experiment to test the impacts of uncertainty, the magnitude of fines and aversion against making type-I and type-II errors on legal decision making. Measuring uncertainty as the noise of a signal on the defendant's guilt observed by legal...

In a laboratory experiment, we investigate the delegation of real authority in the spirit of the seminal paper by Aghion and Tirole (1997). Agents need to spend effort to identify promising projects, and principals can invest in monitoring to overrule agents with some probability. Based on a...

In case of a conflict of interest between principals and agents, laboratory experiments have demonstrated the existence of a "control premium", i.e. a willingness to accept lower expected payoffs for keeping control. We analyze delegation decisions in a pure moral hazard setting without...