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Strategic communication : an experimental investigation
Eckartz, Katharina; Ehses-Friedrich, Christiane - 2014
other hand the decision makers rely too much on the received information. Moreover, communication as well as payoffs … communication is less biased. In all treatments, however, the messages are more precise than theoretically predicted. …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010260085
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Equilibrium selection in experimental cheap talk games
Groot Ruiz, Adrian de; Offerman, Theo; Onderstal, Sander - 2015
In the past, many refinements have been proposed to select equilibria in cheap talk games. Usually, these refinements were motivated by a discussion of how rational agents would reason in some particular cheap talk games. In this paper, we propose a new refinement and stability measure that is...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010477113
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The role of verifiability and privacy in the strategic provision of performance feedback : theory and experimental evidence
Ertac, Seda; Koçkesen, Levent; Özdemir, Duygu - 2015
We theoretically and experimentally analyze the role of verifiability and privacy in strategic performance feedback using a “one principal-two agent” context with real effort. We confirm the theoretical prediction that information transmission occurs only in verifiable feedbackmechanisms and...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011389425
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Meaning and credibility in experimental cheap‐talk games
Lai, Ernest K.; Lim, Wooyoung - In: Quantitative economics : QE ; journal of the … 9 (2018) 3, pp. 1453-1487
We design experimental games to evaluate the predictive power of the first cheap‐talk refinement, neologism‐proofness. In our first set of treatments designed to evaluate the refinement with its usual emphasis on literal meanings, we find that a fully revealing equilibrium that is...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011994751
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Strategic reasoning in persuasion games : an experiment
Li, Ying Xue; Schipper, Burkhard - 2018
We study experimentally persuasion games in which a sender (e.g., a seller) with private information provides verifiable but potentially vague information (e.g., about the quality of a product) to a receiver (e.g., a buyer). Various theoretical solution concepts such as sequential equilibrium or...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011811807
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Lying About What You Know or About What You Do?
Serra-Garcia, Marta; Damme, Eric E. C. van; Potters, … - 2011
We compare communication about private information to communication about actions in a one-shot 2-person public good …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014196597
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Lying About What You Know or About What You Do?
Serra-Garcia, Marta; Damme, Eric E. C. van; Potters, … - 2015
We compare communication about private information to communication about actions in a one-shot 2-person public good …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014165459
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Strategic feedback in teams : theory and experimental evidence
Ertac, Seda; Gümren, Mert; Koçkesen, Levent - 2017
FeedbackWe theoretically and experimentally analyze public and private feedback in teams that are characterized by different performance technologies. We consider a setting where the principal can provide truthful information on agents’ performances or strategically withhold feedback. We find...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011737852
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Strategic Reasoning in Persuasion Games : An Experiment
Li, Ying Xue - 2020
We study experimentally persuasion games in which a sender (e.g., a seller) with private information provides verifiable but potentially vague information (e.g., about the quality of a product) to a receiver (e.g., a buyer). Various theoretical solution concepts such as sequential equilibrium or...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012852811
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Whom are you talking with? : an experiment on credibility and communication structure
Grandjean, Gilles; Mantovani, Marco; Mauleon, Ana; … - 2014
The paper analyzes the role of the structure of communication - i.e. who is talking with whom - on the choice of … analysis of credibility, the subjects should communicate and play the Pareto optimal equilibrium only when communication is … disregard communication. The experimental data conform to our predictions: the agents reach the Pareto-dominant equilibrium only …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010418867