We analyze choices of sellers, each setting a reserve price in a laboratory first price auction with automated equilibrium bidding. Subjects are allowed to gain experience for a fixed period of time prior to making a single payoff-relevant choice. Behavior of more experienced sellers was...

Subjects chose whether to leave with an endowment or stay to perform some simple tasks in a real effort experiment. In addition to performance pay, staying subjects received their endowment in the control condition, but had to sacrifice it in the treatment condition. We found average performance...

Offers can increase in the ultimatum game if the recipient can select her proposer, both with non-competitive selection, where the recipient decides whether she wants to play with a single potential proposer, and even more so with competitive selection, where the recipient decides which of two...

Deceptive communication or behavior can inflict loss, making it important to be able to distinguish these from trustworthy ones. This article pursues the hypothesis that repeated exposure or experience can cause learning and hence better detection of deception. We investigate using data from a...

Our study examines the impact of framing of tasks on dictator game choices. We specifically examine the effect of using two different framing of instructions, one of which we deem the charity frame and the other the group frame. The former frames the dictator choice in terms of giving to a...

We study ultimatum and dictator environments with one-way, unenforceable pre-play communication from the proposer to the recipient, semantically framed as a promise. After observing this promise regarding how much the proposer will offer if selected, in our treatment conditions, recipients...

We conduct an experiment using sequential dictator games where two dictators give serially to a common recipient. In the treatment conditions, the second dictator knows the outcome in the first game and thus the endowment of the recipient. Across treatment conditions, we alter the mechanism that...