The standard Bayesian model implies that information can never have a negative value. We put this implication to the proof. Our paper provides the first test of the value (positive or negative) of information under uncertainty. We show that the "Bayesian implication" stands in conflict with the...

We propose a foundation for expressive voting that is based on a novel theory of social preferences under risk. Under our proposal, expressive considerations in voting endogenously arise from the particular way in which risky social prospects are assessed. To motivate this connection, we relate...

Decision makers with other-regarding preferences may care not just about others' outcomes but also about their opportunities. In social situations involving risk, this often results in their choices violating stochastic dominance, a property that underlies both expected and non-expected utility...

We propose and axiomatize a decision model of social preferences under risk that considers decision makers for whom generous behavior is driven largely by an egoistical desire to perceive themselves as prosocial. Our model considers a setup with a decision maker (DM) and one other individual. It...

We propose and axiomatize a decision model of social preferences under risk that captures motivated reasoning in social assessments. Our model considers a setup with a decision maker (DM) and one other individual. It highlights how the presence of risk enables the DM to egoistically exploit the...

As is well-known, choices of a decision maker (DM) who attempts self-control in the face of temptation may exhibit menu effects and “non-standard” patterns. Existing models can accommodate some of these patterns but not others; e.g., they can explain self-control undermining menu effects,...