Dynamic oligopoly estimators have become a workhorse for industry studies in empirical industrial organization. We evaluate parameter recovery and counterfactual predictions for such environments using laboratory data. In our experimental setting we characterize a symmetric Markov-perfect...

We evaluate dynamic oligopoly estimators with laboratory data. Using a stylized en-try/exit game, we estimate structural parameters under the assumption that the data are generated by a Markov-perfect equilibrium (MPE) and use the estimates to predict counterfactual behavior. The concern is that...

We evaluate dynamic oligopoly estimators with laboratory data. Using a stylized en-try/exit game, we estimate structural parameters under the assumption that the data are generated by a Markov-perfect equilibrium (MPE) and use the estimates to predict counterfactual behavior. The concern is that...

This paper studies experimentally the selection of strategies in a canonical dynamic environment, the dynamic common pool game. The main goal is to evaluate if behavior can be rationalized with strategies that condition on past play that can support efficient outcomes, or with stationary Markov...

Accounting for sample selection is a challenge not only for empirical researchers, but also for the agents populating our models. Yet most models abstract from these issues and assume that agents successfully tackle selection problems. We design an experiment where a person who understands...

We implement multi-sender cheap talk in the laboratory. While full-information transmission is not theoretically feasible in the standard one-sender-one- dimension model, in this setting with more senders and dimensions, full revelation is generically a robust equilibrium outcome. Our...