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We present a theoretical model of a linear public good game in which heterogeneous players express social approval after observing contributions. The model explains how social approval is expressed and predicts positive contributions if subjects have a preference for social approval. Using a...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009427179
We experimentally investigate a finitely repeated public good game with varying partners. Within each period, participants are pairwise matched and contribute simultaneously. Participants are informed about contributions and each participant evaluates her partner's contribution. At the beginning...
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Using a repeated public good game with stranger matching, we compare how two different reputation systems with endogenous evaluations affect rates of cooperation. Contributions are public information and each participant evaluates her partner's contribution. At the beginning of each period,...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012935786
We present a theoretical model of a linear public good game in which heterogeneous players express social approval after observing contributions. The model explains how social approval is expressed and predicts positive contributions if subjects have a preference for social approval. Using a...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014166899
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009380793
We propose a dual selves model to integrate affective responses and belief-dependent emotions into game theory. We apply our model to team production and model a worker as being composed of a rational self, who chooses effort, and an emotional self, who expresses esteem. Similar to psychological...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012062314
Debating over efficiency-enhancing but inequality-increasing reforms accounts for the routine business of democratic institutions. Fernandez and Rodrik (1991) hold that anti-reform bias can be attributed to individual-specific uncertainty regarding the distribution of gains and losses resulting...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010765085
Debating over efficiency-enhancing but inequality-increasing reforms accounts for the routine business of democratic institutions. Fernandez and Rodrik (1991) hold that anti-reform bias can be attributed to individual-specific uncertainty regarding the distribution of gains and losses resulting...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010931009