We conduct a lab experiment to investigate the impact of partisan culture and partisan identity on corruption behavior based on China's Communist Party (CCP). Subjects are randomly assigned to a prime condition that increases the salience of CCP partisan concept or to a control condition in...

We investigate corruption as a social dilemma by means of a bribery game in which a risk of collective sanction of the public officials is introduced when the number of officials accepting a bribe from firms reaches a certain threshold. We show that, despite the social risk, the pursuit of...

We explore the effectiveness of an anti-corruption mechanism that combines the top-down institutions and the bottom-up monitoring from the masses. Based on a repeated stranger matching harassment bribe game, we introduce the interventions of the group monitoring and the endogenous crackdown....

We explore the effectiveness of an anti-corruption mechanism that combines both the merits of the top-down institutions and the bottom-up monitoring from the masses. Based on a repeated stranger matching harassment bribe game, we introduce a group monitoring mechanism that corrupt officials’...

This chapter reviews the recent literature on cheating and corruption to demonstrate the value that experimental methods hold for studying dishonesty in developing countries. Emphasizing the diversity of experimental methods, the chapter highlights the contributions of laboratory and field...

We study cheating as a collective-risk social dilemma in a group setting in which individuals are asked to report their actual outcomes. Misreporting their outcomes increases the individual's earnings but when the sum of claims in the group reaches a certain threshold, a risk of collective...

We study cheating as a collective-risk social dilemma in a group setting in which individuals are asked to report their actual outcomes. Misreporting their outcomes increases the individual’s earnings but when the sum of claims in the group reaches a certain threshold, a risk of collective...

We study cheating as a collective-risk social dilemma in a group setting in which individuals are asked to report their actual outcomes. Misreporting their outcomes increases the individual's earnings but when the sum of claims in the group reaches a certain threshold, a risk of collective...