Recent literature has shown that lying behavior in the laboratory can well be explained by a combination of lying costs and reputation concerns. We extend the literature on lying behavior to strategic interactions. As reciprocal behavior is important in many interactions, we study a theoretical...

Based on a simple theoretical model, we use a laboratory experiment to test the impacts of uncertainty, the magnitude of fines and aversion against making type-I and type-II errors on legal decision making. Measuring uncertainty as the noise of a signal on the defendant's guilt observed by legal...

In a laboratory experiment, we investigate the delegation of real authority in the spirit of the seminal paper by Aghion and Tirole (1997). Agents need to spend effort to identify promising projects, and principals can invest in monitoring to overrule agents with some probability. Based on a...

In case of a conflict of interest between principals and agents, laboratory experiments have demonstrated the existence of a "control premium", i.e. a willingness to accept lower expected payoffs for keeping control. We analyze delegation decisions in a pure moral hazard setting without...

With a unique data set from New Zealand which allows us to assign each bet to individual bettors, we analyze the impact of experience on behavior and success in non-parimutuel (fixed odds) sports betting markets. We find that experienced bettors bet more on favorites than inexperienced bettors...