Offers can increase in the ultimatum game if the recipient can select her proposer, both with non-competitive selection, where the recipient decides whether she wants to play with a single potential proposer, and even more so with competitive selection, where the recipient decides which of two...

We conduct dictator games in our artefactual field experiment with 11th and 12th grade students in New Delhi, India. We construct an economic status index based on household ownership of assets for our subjects. Using cut-offs from this index, we randomly match dictators to recipients who are...

Our study examines the impact of framing of tasks on dictator game choices. We specifically examine the effect of using two different framing of instructions, one of which we deem the charity frame and the other the group frame. The former frames the dictator choice in terms of giving to a...

We study the joint effect of self-confidence and social identity on labor market inequality in an experimental Indian labor market where employers and workers come from different castes. Employers evaluate resumes in order to predict future productivity of workers who perform a real effort task....

In this paper we contribute to the literature by examining if confidence, beliefs about competitor, willingness to compete and performance of individuals in a real-effort task are conditioned on the relative economic status of their potential competitor. We conduct our study among 1025...

We study ultimatum and dictator environments with one-way, unenforceable pre-play communication from the proposer to the recipient, semantically framed as a promise. After observing this promise regarding how much the proposer will offer if selected, in our treatment conditions, recipients...