This paper examines strategic adaptation in participants’ behavior conditional on the type of their opponent. Participants played a constant-sum game for 100 rounds against each of three pattern-detecting computer algorithms designed to exploit regularities in human behavior such as...

This paper aspires to fill a conspicuous gap in the literature regarding learning in games — the absence of empirical verification of learning rules involving pattern recognition. Weighted fictitious play is extended to detect two-period patterns in opponents’ behavior and to comply with the...

We test empirically the strategic counterpart of the Adaptive Decision Maker hypothesis (Payne et al., 1993), which states that decision makers adapt their attention and decision rules to time pressure in predictable ways. For twenty-nine normal form games, we test whether players adapt to...

For decisions in the wild, time is of the essence. Available decision time is often cut short through natural or artificial constraints, or is impinged upon by the opportunity cost of time. Experimental economists have only recently begun to conduct experiments with time constraints and to...

The investigation of response time and behavior has a long tradition in cognitive psychology, particularly for non-strategic decision-making. Recently, experimental economists have also studied response time in strategic interactions, but within an emphasis on either one-shot games or repeated...

Whether behavior converges toward rational play or fair play in repeated ultimatum games, depends on which player yields first. If responders conceded first by accepting low offers, proposers, would not need to learn to offer more. Play would thus converge toward unequal sharing. If proposers,...