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(Dis)Honest Information Transmission : An Experimental Analysis

Schwarz, Milena - 2014

In this paper, I suggest a new experimental method for measuring (dis)honest information transmission. Subjects play a variant of the dictator game in which the dictator’s decision whether to lie (either to or against his advantage) or whether to be honest, when communicating private...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014144845

Strategic communication : an experimental investigation

Eckartz, Katharina; Ehses-Friedrich, Christiane - 2014

other hand the decision makers rely too much on the received information. Moreover, communication as well as payoffs … communication is less biased. In all treatments, however, the messages are more precise than theoretically predicted. …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010260085

Strategic reasoning in persuasion games : an experiment

Li, Ying Xue; Schipper, Burkhard - 2018

We study experimentally persuasion games in which a sender (e.g., a seller) with private information provides verifiable but potentially vague information (e.g., about the quality of a product) to a receiver (e.g., a buyer). Various theoretical solution concepts such as sequential equilibrium or...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011811807

Lying About What You Know or About What You Do?

Serra-Garcia, Marta; Damme, Eric E. C. van; Potters, … - 2011

We compare communication about private information to communication about actions in a one-shot 2-person public good …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014196597

Lying About What You Know or About What You Do?

Serra-Garcia, Marta; Damme, Eric E. C. van; Potters, … - 2015

We compare communication about private information to communication about actions in a one-shot 2-person public good …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014165459

Equilibrium selection in experimental cheap talk games

Groot Ruiz, Adrian de; Offerman, Theo; Onderstal, Sander - 2015

In the past, many refinements have been proposed to select equilibria in cheap talk games. Usually, these refinements were motivated by a discussion of how rational agents would reason in some particular cheap talk games. In this paper, we propose a new refinement and stability measure that is...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010477113

Communication and voting in heterogeneous committees : an experimental study

Thordal-Le Quement, Mark; Marcin, Isabel - 2016

We study experimentally the effectiveness of communication in common value committees exhibiting publicly known … heterogeneous agents. These predict varying degrees of strategic communication. We use a 2 x 2 design varying the information … protocol (communication vs exogenous public signals) and the group composition (heterogeneous vs homogeneous). Results are only …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011444227

The role of verifiability and privacy in the strategic provision of performance feedback : theory and experimental evidence

Ertac, Seda; Koçkesen, Levent; Özdemir, Duygu - 2015

We theoretically and experimentally analyze the role of verifiability and privacy in strategic performance feedback using a “one principal-two agent” context with real effort. We confirm the theoretical prediction that information transmission occurs only in verifiable feedbackmechanisms and...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011389425

Disguising lies : image concerns and partial lying in cheating games

Khalmetski, Kiryl; Sliwka, Dirk - 2017

We study equilibrium reporting behavior in Fischbacher and Föllmi-Heusi (2013) type cheating games when agents have a fixed cost of lying and image concerns not to be perceived as a liar. We show that equilibria naturally arise in which agents with low costs of lying randomize among a set of...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011603130

Does Cheap Talk Promote Coordination Under Asymmetric Information? An Experimental Study on Global Games

Duan, Jieyi - 2020

This study experimentally investigates the role of two-sided cheap talk in decisions under asymmetric information. Unlike previous studies, our study also considers endogenous investment timing. In our experiments, subjects play two-player global games with asymmetric information. Before making...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012849211