We study environments in which agents are randomly matched to play a Prisoner's Dilemma, and each player observes a few of the partner's past actions against previous opponents. We depart from the existing related literature by allowing a small fraction of the population to be commitment types....

We propose a new explanation of the endowment effect. The value of exchanged goods is uncertain. Specifically, the value is assumed to be ambiguous, represented by a set of probability distributions over possible values. Ambiguity averse agents (maxmin expected utility maximisers) set WTA and...

Multiple studies suggest that, contrary to economic rationale, offering monetary incentives to complete a task can negatively affect task performance. This phenomenon is attributed to so-called crowding-out effects, in which monetary rewards “crowd out” non-monetary sources of value that...

We study the idea that seemingly unrelated behavioral biases can coevolve if they jointly compensate for the errors that any one of them would give rise to in isolation. We suggest that the "endowment effect" and the "winner's curse" could have jointly survived natural selection together. We...

We study population dynamics under which each revising agent tests each strategy k times, with each trial being against a newly drawn opponent, and chooses the strategy whose mean payoff was highest. When k = 1, defection is globally stable in the prisoner's dilemma. By contrast, when k 1 we...