We examine how clawback provisions and board monitoring affect managers' use of discretion to achieve earnings targets. Using an experiment, we find that when board monitoring is weak, imposing clawback provisions has little impact on the total amount of earnings management activity. This null...

We examine how the level and structure of CEO pay is influenced by the characteristics and past experience of the members of the compensation committee, and also how these characteristics and experiences affect the probability of committee appointment. Our main findings indicate that (1) CEO pay...

I show that stochastic contracts generate powerful incentives when agents suffer from probability distortion. When implementing these contracts, the principal can target probability distortions in order to inflate the agent's perceived benefits of exerting high levels of effort. This novel...

This study experimentally investigates how a principal uses outcome information in her subjective evaluation of an agent who chooses between alternatives of differing risks, and how outcome bias in the evaluation is related to the agent's risk taking decision. We consider both a situation of...

We conducted a lab experiment with 253 participants to examine how constraints on bonus akin to bonus regulations, such as bonus cap and malus, could affect individuals' risk-taking in the presence of relative performance pay. Participants took greater risks when bonus was linked to investment...

Classic financial agency theory recommends compensation through stock options rather than shares to induce risk neutrality in otherwise risk averse agents. In an experiment, we find that subjects acting as executives do also take risks that are excessive from the perspective of shareholders if...