Similar Search Results

Ingratiation and favoritism : experimental evidence

Robin, Stéphane; Rusinowska, Agnieszka; Villeval, … - 2012

; experiment …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009537226

Team production benefits from a permanent fear of exclusion

Kopányi-Peuker, Anita; Offerman, Theo; Sloof, Randolph - 2015

threat of terminating them from the team (Alchian and Demsetz, 1972). We extend a standard weakest link experiment with a …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010532586

Ingratiation and Favoritism : Experimental Evidence

Robin, Stéphane - 2012

We provide experimental evidence of workers' ingratiation by opinion conformity and of managers' discrimination in favor of workers with whom they share similar opinions. In our Baseline, managers can observe both workers' performance at a task and opinions before assigning unequal payoffs. In...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013106646

Promotions and Incentives : The Case of Multi-Stage Elimination Tournaments

Altmann, Steffen; Falk, Armin; Wibral, Matthias - 2021

of our laboratory experiment is a two-stage tournament in which equilibrium efforts are the same in both stages. We …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013324780

Ingratiation : Experimental Evidence

Robin, Stéphane; Rusinowska, Agnieszka; Villeval, … - 2013

We investigate experimentally ingratiatory behavior expressed by opinion conformity. Both individuals’ performance at a task and their opinions on various topics can be observed before unequal payoffs are assigned by a second mover. In some treatments, first movers can change their opinion...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014170032

Trust and Incentives in Principal-Agent Negotiations : The 'Insurance/Incentive Trade-Off'

Whitford, Andrew B. - 2005

inefficient risk-sharing. These experimental outcomes, while anomalous from the standpoint of principal-agency theory, are quite … may allow an outcome preferred, by both principal and agent, to that deemed possible by principal-agency theory. If this … is true, then the lessons to be learned from principal-agency theory are all the wrong ones. Concentrating on incentives …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014027929

A Political Theory of Russian Orthodoxy : Evidence from Public Goods Experiments

Grigoriadis, Theocharis - 2013

In this paper, I test the effects of religious norms on the provision of public goods. My evidence is drawn from public goods experiments that I ran with regional bureaucrats in Tomsk and Novosibirsk, Russia. I introduce three treatments, which I define as degrees of Eastern Orthodox...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013081362

Group Monitoring, Endogenous Crackdown and Anti-corruption : An Experiment

Jiang, Shuguang - 2020

We explore the effectiveness of an anti-corruption mechanism that combines the top-down institutions and the bottom-up monitoring from the masses. Based on a repeated stranger matching harassment bribe game, we introduce the interventions of the group monitoring and the endogenous crackdown....

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012849032

Unintended Consequences of Corruption Indices : An Experimental Approach

Chapkovski, Philipp - 2022

Using the results of a large-scale (N=900) online experiment, this paper investigates how the information about a group …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013290679

I sell my vote, and so what? : incidence, social bias, and correlates of clientelism in Colombia

Fergusson, Leopoldo; Molina, Carlos; Riaño, Juan Felipe - In: Economia : journal of the Latin American and Caribbean … 19 (2018) 1, pp. 181-218

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011940830