Showing 1 - 10 of 44
We test the importance of social norms for market interactions associated with negative real-world externalities in a large-scale experiment with a heterogeneous population sample from Germany. The majority of experimental participants refuses to trade, thus behaving in a moral way. Our data...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012431941
We show that it is beneficial for a buyer to conduct a multi-stage mechanism if bidders are loss averse. In a first step, we derive a revenue equivalence principle. Fixing the multi-stage structure, the revenue is independent of the chosen payment rule. Secondly, we introduce a simple two-stage...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012146346
We show that it is beneficial for a buyer to conduct a multi-stage mechanism if bidders are loss averse. In a first step, we derive a revenue equivalence principle. Fixing the multi-stage structure, the revenue is independent of the chosen payment rule. Secondly, we introduce a simple two-stage...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012146978
We examine bidding behavior in first-price sealed-bid and Dutch auctions, which are strategically equivalent under standard preferences. We investigate whether the empirical breakdown of this equivalence is due to (non-standard) preferences or due to the different complexity of the two formats...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011753992
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012125891
We examine bidding behavior in first-price sealed-bid and Dutch auctions, which are strategically equivalent under standard preferences. We investigate whether the empirical breakdown of this equivalence is due to (non-standard) preferences or due to the different complexity of the two formats...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011754320
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011594130
In auctions bidders are usually assumed to have rational expectations with regards to their winning probability. However, experimental and empirical evidence suggests that agent's expectations depend on direct utility stemming from expectations, resulting in optimism or pessimism. Optimism...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013463574
We study the role of commitment in a first-price auction environment. We devise a simple two-stage model in which bidders first submit an initial offer that the auctioneer can observe and then make a counteroffer. There is no commitment on the auctioneer's side to accept an offer as is or even...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012150752
In auctions bidders are usually assumed to have rational expectations with regards to their winning probability. However, experimental and empirical evidence suggests that agent's expectations depend on direct utility stemming from expectations, resulting in optimism or pessimism. Optimism...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013464284