We investigate the Baron-Ferejohn (1989a) bargaining model of legislative behavior comparing open versus closed amendment rules. The data are qualitatively consistent with the theory as there are longer delays in distributing benefits and a more egalitarian distribution of benefits under the...

This paper introduces an empirical strategy to estimate dynamic treatment effects in randomized trials that provide treatment in multiple stages and in which various noncompliance problems arise such as attrition and selective transitions between treatment and control groups. Our approach is...

We conduct a series of laboratory experiments to understand what role commitment and reputation play in bargaining. The experiments implement the Abreu and Gul (2000) bargaining model that demonstrates how introducing behavioral types, which are obstinate in their demands, creates incentives for...

This paper introduces an empirical strategy to estimate dynamic treatment effects in randomized trials that provide treatment in multiple stages and in which various noncompliance problems arise such as attrition and selective transitions between treatment and control groups. Our approach is...

We conduct a series of laboratory experiments to understand if gradual exogenous revelation of sellers’ private information influences how trades occur in both the competitive market and bilateral bargaining settings where a static lemon condition holds. Our experiments implement the Daley and...