We study the role of norm violations and learning behavior in multi- and single-worker gift-exchange games and find that working with co-workers leads to a twofold effect. First, flexible wages yield moderately higher efforts than in the single-employee treatment. The data suggests that this is...

This paper experimentally investigates the determinants of charitable giving. It focuses on the joint analysis of two prominent gender differences, i.e., disparities in dictator giving and risk taking. In a within-subjects experiment, we test the impact of risk preferences on donations. The data...

This paper analyzes gender differences in access to competitive positions. We implement an experiment where workers can apply for a job promotion by sending a signal to their employer. We control for gender differences in anticipation of discrimination in a treatment where a computer randomly...

This paper experimentally studies the disposition effects of teams and individuals. The disposition effect describes the phenomenon that investors are reluctant to realize losses, whereas winners are sold too early. Our experiments compare the investments of two-person teams to a setting where...

This paper experimentally tests the coordination of partial cartels when payoffs are asymmetric. In a two-stage mechanism with communication we analyze the formation of all-inclusive and partial cartels. Firms reject partial cartels if outside firms profit excessively from cartel formation....

We analyze dictator allocation decisions in an experiment where the recipients have to earn the pot to be divided with a real-effort task. As the recipients move before the dictators, their effort decisions resemble the first move in a trust game. Depending on the recipients' performance, the...

This paper tests motivational crowding out in the domain of charitable giving. A novelty is that our experiment isolates alternative explanations for the decline of giving such as strategic considerations of decision makers. Moreover, preference elicitation allows us to focus on the reaction of...

We analyze linear, weakest-link and best-shot public goods games in which a distinguished team member, the team allocator, has property rights over the benefits from the public good and can distribute them among team members. These team allocator games are intended to capture natural asymmetries...

We analyze linear, weakest-link and best-shot public goods games in which a distinguished team member, the team allocator, has property rights over the benefits from the public good and can distribute them among team members. These team allocator games are intended to capture natural asymmetries...