Given traditional agency theory assumptions and unobservable effort in a single-period setting, a moral hazard arises in which the agent is expected to shirk and provide the miminal possible effort after contracting with the principal. Traditional solutions to this agency problem include paying...

We draw on theory from moral licensing and image motivation to test the prediction that, when auditors provide assurance over a pro-social activity that is roughly analogous to reported corporate social responsibility (CSR), reporters become more aggressive in subsequent reporter-auditor...

We examine the effect of endogenous contract selection on budgetary slack using two slack-inducing contracts found in the literature: a trust contract where the superior must accept the subordinate’s budget and a discretion contract where the superior can accept or reject the budget. Because...

This study examines the effects of profit-sharing on honesty in managerial reporting. While profit-sharing plans are widely used, there remains a need for understanding how profit-sharing plans affect honesty in managerial reporting. We investigate two commonly observed profit-sharing plans...

While managers commonly possess private information regarding future production cost when developing their cost budget, they also face outcome uncertainty regarding that future cost. This outcome uncertainty, however, has largely been ignored by experimental researchers examining various...