The well-known Blackwell's theorem states the equivalence of statistical informativeness and economic valuableness. Celen (2012) generalizes this theorem, which is well-known for subjective expected utility (SEU), to maxmin expected utility (MEU) preferences. We demonstrate that the underlying...

We explored experimentally how threshold uncertainty affects coordination success in a threshold public goods game. Whereas all groups succeeded in providing the public good when the exact value of the threshold was known, uncertainty was generally detrimental for the public good provision. The...

Free riding and coordination difficulties are held to be the primary causes of cooperation breakdown among nonrelatives. These thwarting effects are particularly severe in the absence of effective monitoring institutions capable of sanctioning deviant behavior. Unfortunately, solutions to global...

We introduce hierarchical decision-making in a repeated public goods experiment where representatives decide on contributions and punishment not only on their behalf, but also on behalf of their team members. We confirm the established finding that punishment reverses the slide towards the zero...

Substantial evidence has accumulated in recent empirical works on the limited ability of the Nash equilibrium to rationalize observed behavior in many classes of games played by experimental subjects. This realization has led to several attempts aimed at finding tractable equilibrium concepts...

We explored experimentally how threshold uncertainty affects coordination success in a threshold public goods game. Whereas all groups succeeded in providing the public good when the exact value of the threshold was known, uncertainty was generally detrimental for the public good provision. The...