We revisit the sequential search problem by Hey (J Econ Behav Organ 8:137–144, <CitationRef CitationID="CR16">1987</CitationRef>). In a 2 <InlineEquation ID="IEq1"> <EquationSource Format="TEX">$$\times $$</EquationSource> <EquationSource Format="MATHML"> <math xmlns:xlink="http://www.w3.org/1999/xlink"> <mo>×</mo> </math> </EquationSource> </InlineEquation> 2 factorial design, varying fixed and random cost treatments with and without recall, we address open research questions that were originally stated by Hey (<CitationRef CitationID="CR16">1987</CitationRef>). Our results...</citationref></equationsource></equationsource></inlineequation></citationref>

<Para ID="Par1">This paper identifies, and tests experimentally, a prediction of the Nash bargaining axioms that may appear counterintuitive. The context is a simple bargaining problem in which two players have to agree a choice from three alternatives. One alternative favours one player and a second favours...</para>

<Para ID="Par1">This is an account of my work on experimental economics over the years. Copyright Springer Science+Business Media New York 2014