Conventions can be narrowly interpreted as coordinated ways of equilibriumplay, i.e., a specific convention tells all players in a game withmultiple strict equilibria which equilibrium to play. In our view, coordinationoften takes place before learning about the games. Thus, one hasto coordinate...

A novel two-person "charity game" is used to experimentally investigate whether anticipation of help crowds out incentives to work, and therefore impulses to help. We distinguish two treatments differing in whether the causes of neediness are verifiable or not. Helping behavior does not vary...

Are commonly known beliefs essential for bidding behavior in asymmetric auctions? Our experimental results suggest that not informing participants how values are randomly generated does not change behavior much and may even make it appear more rational.

A procurement contract is granted by a bureaucrat (the auctioneer)who is interested in a low price and a bribe from the provider.The optimal bids and bribes are derived based on an iid private costassumption. In the experiment, bribes are negatively framed (betweensubjectstreatment) to capture...

This paper experimentally investigates the interdependence between market competition and endogenously emerging inter-firm collaboration. We restrict attention to arrangements resulting from bilateral collaboration agreements that typically characterize real world applications in which the...

This paper reports results of an experiment designed to analyze the link between risky decisions made by couples and risky decisions made separately by each spouse. We estimate both the spouses and the couples’ degrees of risk aversion and we assess how the risk preferences of the two...

Completeness, the most commonly assumed axiom in preference theory, has not received much attention from the experimental literature. Indeed, incomplete preferences model a cognitive phenomenon (an agent's inability to compare alternatives), and therefore cannot be directly revealed through...

We consider a modified pure public good game characterized by a pre-play negotiation stage, on which pairs of players can form binding cooperation commitments. As the introduced mechanism only supports pairwise rather than more inclusive commitments, it does not implement the efficient outcome....

This paper investigates market failures due to strategic delays. We test experimentally a discrete model of dynamic investment, where two privately informed agents have an option to invest at the time of their choice in the presence of waiting costs. The equilibrium outcome of our experimental...

Recently, new game theoretic approaches have been suggested that address the emergence of inter-firm collaborative agreements (strategic alliances) that are situated between standard market transactions of unrelated companies and their integration by means of mergers and acquisitions. This paper...